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ABSTRACT
In March 2018, Congress passed the Clarifying Lawful
Overseas Use of Data Act, also known as the CLOUD Act,
in order to expedite the process of cross-border data
transfers for the purposes of criminal investigations. The
U.S. government entered into its first Executive Agreement,
the main tool to achieve the goals of the statute, with the
United Kingdom in October 2019. While the CLOUD Act
requires the U.S. Attorney General to consider whether the
foreign government counterpart has a certain level of robust
data privacy laws, the relevant laws of the United Kingdom
have generally been questioned numerous times for their
inadequacies in protecting privacy. Thus, the privacy of U.S.
citizens may be in jeopardy under the new agreement.
Although the texts of the CLOUD Act and the Executive
Agreement clarify that the UK government cannot explicitly
target the data of U.S. citizens, it does not guarantee that
such information will not be gathered incidentally. First, the
UK courts do not adhere to the equivalent level of probable
cause standard that is demanded under the Fourth
Amendment. Therefore, they may issue judicial orders to
force the U.S.-based service providers to deliver certain
*
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data, which may include information that belongs to the U.S.
citizens, to the UK government upon finding mere possibility
of relevance to the investigations. Coupled with this fact is
arguably less robust privacy protection in the United
Kingdom, from which it is not difficult to imagine a situation
where the private information of U.S. citizens is extracted
while the UK government seeks data belonging to citizens of
its own. This Article argues that the threat to the data
privacy of U.S. citizens via incidental collection is not only
possible, but probable. At the same time, this Article
explores possible solutions to fill in the identified gaps in the
CLOUD Act that would enhance the protection of U.S.
citizens’ data privacy from incidental collection.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the emergence of cloud computing1 more than a decade
ago, communications service providers have been storing
consumers’ data on servers in different jurisdictions. 2 This is
particularly a problem for law enforcement agencies when they need
to extract relevant data from the service providers for the purpose of
criminal investigations. For example, even if the U.S.-based service
providers are under the jurisdiction of the U.S. government, for
example, the data sought may be subject to the jurisdiction of
another country due to the location of the server. In such cases, the
agencies seeking data evidence will need to use “cross-border data
access procedures” to obtain the data in question. 3 If the laws of
different countries regarding disclosure of such data conflict with
each other, the communication service providers “may be forced to
choose which country’s law to follow, knowing that they may face
consequences for violating the other country’s laws.”4

1

See
What
is
cloud
computing?,
MICROSOFT
AZURE,
https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/overview/what-is-cloud-computing/ (defining
cloud computing as “the delivery of computing services—including servers, or
storage, databases, networking, software, analytics, and intelligence—over the
internet . . . to offer faster innovation, flexible resources, and economies of scale”)
(last visited Feb. 9, 2020).
2
Secil Bilgic, Something Old, Something New, and Something Moot: The
Privacy Crisis Under the CLOUD Act, 32 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 322 (2018)
(“To achieve these benefits [of prevention of the loss of data due to computer
crashes, less vulnerability to theft, and providing an easy medium to share files],
cloud service providers move an individual’s data from one jurisdiction to
another . . . .”).
3
Id. at 323.
4
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., WHITE PAPER ON PROMOTING PUBLIC SAFETY,
PRIVACY, AND THE RULE OF LAW AROUND THE WORLD: THE PURPOSE AND
IMPACT
OF
THE
CLOUD
ACT,
at
3
(2019),
https://www.justice.gov/dag/page/file/1153436/download.
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One of the main methods of data transfer for criminal
investigation purposes is the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty
(MLAT). 5 However, this method has often proven to be
cumbersome and time-consuming to the detriment of timely
prosecution of criminals in some cases.6 In March 2018, Congress
passed the Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act (CLOUD
Act) in order to expedite the process of cross-border data transfer
for the purposes of criminal investigations.7 The statute attempts to
achieve this by providing a legal basis for bilateral agreements
between the U.S. government and a foreign government, which
would allow for transfer of data while bypassing the requirements
under an MLAT.
Since the enactment of the CLOUD Act, scholars have focused
on many aspects and potential effects of the statute: practical
implementation of the statute in a world where data fragmentation
is prevalent, 8 data localization, 9 encryption and decryption, 10 and
possible jurisdictional conflicts 11 as well as discussions on the
CLOUD Act in regards to cybercrimes12. The statute was passed as
part of an omnibus spending bill “with unusual speed and no
debate.”13 Consequently, there has been much uncertainty as to how
the statute will be applied in reality.14 For example, the CLOUD Act
See infra Section I.A.1.
See Stephen P. Mulligan, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45173, CROSSBORDER DATA SHARING UNDER THE CLOUD ACT (2018).
7
Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act, Consolidated Appropriations
Act of 2018, Pub. L. 115-141, 132 Stat. 348, div. 5, 1213-25 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.) [hereinafter CLOUD Act].
8
See generally Frederick T. Davis & Anna R. Gressel, Feature, Storm Clouds
or Silver Linings? The Impact of the U.S. CLOUD Act, 45 LITIG. 47 (2018).
9
See generally Shelli Gimelstein, A Location-Based Test for Jurisdiction
Over Data: The Consequences for Global Online Privacy, 2018 U. ILL. J.L. TECH.
& POL’Y 1 (2018).
10
See generally Olivia Gonzalez, Cracks in the Armor: Legal Approaches to
Encryption, 19 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1 (2019).
11
See generally Sabrina A. Morris, Rethinking the Extraterritorial Scope of
the United States’ Access to Data Stored by a Third Party, 42 FORDHAM INT’L
L.J. 183 (2018).
12
See generally Chris Cook, Cross-Border Data Access and Active Cyber
Defense: Assessing Legislative Options for a New International Cybersecurity
Rulebook, 29 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 205 (2018).
13
Davis & Gressel, supra note 8, at 48.
14
See generally Dechert LLP et al., Actual Impact of 2018 U.S. CLOUD Act
5
6
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establishes certain requirements that a foreign government must
satisfy in order to be eligible to form an executive agreement with
the United States under the CLOUD Act, through which data
transfer may be possible for criminal investigations. 15 The statute,
however, does not elaborate on how these factors—which include
adequacy of laws and legal system in protecting fundamental human
rights and civil rights, and against cybercrimes 16—will come into
play as the U.S. government considers a foreign government’s
eligibility for an executive agreement.
Indeed, privacy has also been at the heart of the conversation
surrounding the new statute.17 One of the problems flagged shortly
after its enactment was the possibility of incidental collection of data
under the CLOUD Act.18 In the midst of reports from the European
Data Protection Board and the Law Council of Australia indicating
that the CLOUD Act would be incompatible with their equivalent
laws, albeit for different reasons, 19 the U.S. government entered into
its first Executive Agreement under the CLOUD Act with the United
Kingdom (Executive Agreement) in October 2019.20 In light of the
newly signed Executive Agreement, this Article goes further by
arguing that the threat to data privacy of U.S. citizens via incidental
collection under the CLOUD Act is not only possible, but probable.

Still
Hazy,
JDSUPRA
(July
22,
2019),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/actual-impact-of-2018-u-s-cloud-act85768/; see also Davis & Gressel, supra note 8, at 50 (stating that the CLOUD
Act does not clarify whether it would apply to non-U.S. providers and that “the
CLOUD Act does not fully address how these executive agreements will work in
practice”).
15
See 18 U.S.C. § 2523(b) (2018).
16
See id. § 2523(b)(1)(B).
17
See Bilgic, supra note 2 (discussing the privacy implications of the
CLOUD Act for non-U.S. citizens).
18
David Ruiz, A New Backdoor Around the Fourth Amendment: The CLOUD
Act,
ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER
FOUND.
(Mar.
13,
2018),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/03/new-backdoor-around-fourthamendment-cloud-act.
19
See infra Section I.C.
20
See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., U.S. and UK Sign Landmark CrossBorder Data Access Agreement to Combat Criminals and Terrorists Online (Oct.
3, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-and-uk-sign-landmark-cross-borderdata-access-agreement-combat-criminals-and-terrorists.
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While the CLOUD Act requires the U.S. Attorney General to
consider whether the foreign government counterpart has a certain
level of robust data privacy laws, 21 the relevant laws of the United
Kingdom have been questioned numerous times for their
inadequacies. 22 To be sure, the United Kingdom’s most recent
surveillance law, the Investigatory Powers Act, includes judicial
oversight 23—an addition to its previous laws struck down by the
Court of Justice of the European Union and the UK courts. 24
Nonetheless, there have been doubts that the new statute actually
improved the protection of data privacy of the citizens.25 Indeed, the
U.S. Attorney General has not provided justifications as to how and
why the United Kingdom satisfies the requirements under the
CLOUD Act.
Although the text of both the CLOUD Act and the Executive
Agreement clarify that the UK government cannot explicitly target
the data belonging to U.S. citizens,26 this does not guarantee that
such data will not be gathered incidentally.27 The UK courts do not
The relevant part of the statute reads:
“. . . an executive agreement governing access by a foreign government to
data . . . shall be considered to satisfy the requirements of this section if the
Attorney General, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, determines. . .
that— (1) the domestic law of the foreign government, including the
implementation of that law, affords robust substantive and procedural protections
for privacy and civil liberties in light of the data collection and activities of the
foreign government that will be subject to the agreement. . .” 18 U.S.C.
§2523(b)(1).
22
See infra Section I.A.2.
23
See Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (IPA), c. 1, § 23-25 (Eng.),
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2016/25/contents.
24
See infra Section I.A.2.
25
See Scott Carey, The Snoopers’ Charter: Everything You Need to Know
About the Investigatory Powers Act, COMPUTERWORLD (July 31, 2019),
https://www.computerworld.com/article/3427019/the-snoopers-chartereverything-you-need-to-know-about-the-investigatory-powers-act.html.
26
Under the CLOUD Act, “United States person” refers to “citizens or
national of the United States, an alien lawfully admitted for the permanent
residence . . . or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence” for the purpose
of the statute. 18 U.S.C. § 2523(a)(2). This Article uses the same definition when
referring to “U.S. citizens.”
27
For more information regarding incidental collection in the United States,
see generally BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., Reducing “Incidental” Collection Under
FISA Section 702: A Critical Protection for Americans (Oct. 2017),
21
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need to adhere to an equivalent standard of probable cause
demanded under the Fourth Amendment in ordering the U.S.-based
service providers to deliver certain data—which may include
information belonging to U.S. citizens—to the UK government. 28
This may allow the UK courts to force the transfer of data upon
finding mere possibility of relevance to the investigations. Coupled
with this fact is the arguably less robust privacy protection in the
United Kingdom, 29 from which it is not difficult to imagine a
situation where the data of U.S. citizens is extracted while the UK
government seeks data of targeted UK citizens.
To show that this potential for breach of data privacy of U.S.
citizens is very real, this Article focuses on the United Kingdom’s
invasive surveillance regime and its use of bulk data collection in
conjunction with the lack of equivalent protection of privacy
provided by the Fourth Amendment. These factors may allow
incidental exposure of U.S. citizens’ private data to the UK
government as the entity attempts to gather data of UK citizens
under the Executive Agreement.
By providing background information on the CLOUD Act, Part
I argues that while Congress attempted to address one problem, the
thinness of the solution—the CLOUD Act and the Executive
Agreement—has opened doors for other issues. Part II argues that
the possibility of breach of data privacy of U.S. citizens via
incidental collection is real and probable under the UK surveillance
regime without any Fourth Amendment protection. To facilitate the
discussion, incidental collection under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) will be discussed because of the similarities
between the provisions in FISA and the CLOUD Act as well as the
Executive Agreement.30 Part III suggests recommendations that can
enhance the protection of U.S. citizens’ data privacy by reinforcing
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/FISASection702ReducingIncid
entalCollection.pdf.
28
See Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
on Access to Electronic Data for the Purpose of Countering Serious Crime, U.K.U.S.,
art.
5,
Oct.
3,
2019,
https://www.justice.gov/ag/page/file/1207496/download [hereinafter U.S.-UK/Ir.
Executive Agreement]; see also infra note 132.
29
See infra Section I.A.2.
30
See Ruiz, supra note 18.
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the process of evaluating potential qualifying foreign governments
under the CLOUD Act and increasing the role of the communication
service providers.
I. THE CLOUD ACT AND THE EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT
The inefficiencies of the current methods of cross-border data
transfers and the gap in the relevant statutes—the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act 31 (ECPA) and the Stored
Communications Act (SCA) 32 —in terms of their extraterritorial
reach are the problems the CLOUD Act purported to solve.33 ECPA
and the SCA, arguably outdated statutes, have been construed to
have protection of privacy as their primary purposes, and, as
discussed below, the Second Circuit ruled in accordance with that
purpose in United States v. Microsoft. 34 This Part argues that by
effectively overruling the Circuit’s decision with the CLOUD Act,
Congress considered data privacy to be of secondary importance
compared to the facilitation of criminal investigations. And by
attempting to solve the problems associated with cross-border data
transfers, Congress opened doors to another problem: possibility of
violation of U.S. citizens’ privacy.
After briefly touching on the existing methods of transnational
data transfers for criminal investigation purposes in Section I.A.1,
Section I.A.2 discusses the background statutes that are in play:
ECPA and the SCA. Section I.B.1 will explain the context in which
extraterritorial application of the statutes became an issue before the
Supreme Court in United States v. Microsoft,35 to which Congress
responded by passing the CLOUD Act before the Court rendered an
opinion as discussed in Section I.B.2. Next, initial assessment and
review of the CLOUD Act by the European Data Protection Board
and the Law Council of Australia is discussed in Section I.C to

31

18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-23.
18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-12.
33
See infra Section I.B.
34
See In the Matter of a Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account
Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft Corporation, 829 F.3d 197, 219-20 (2d
Cir. 2016) [hereinafter Microsoft Search Warrant Case].
35
138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018).
32
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identify potential faults in the statute. Finally, Section I.D provides
an overview of relevant terms of the Executive Agreement.
A. Existing Framework for Cross-Border Data Transfers
The existing framework for cross-border data transfer for
criminal investigation purposes are Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaties and Letters Rogatory. The U.S. statutes that operate in the
background are ECPA and the SCA. In essence, the courts consider
these statutes when reviewing requests for data by other countries.
1. MLAT and Letters Rogatory
Prior to the enactment of the CLOUD Act, there were only two
main (internationally established) mechanisms in which litigants in
the United States could request data information located within the
territorial jurisdiction of another country: the letters rogatory and the
Mutual Legal Assistance process (MLA) based on MLAT. 36 One of
the criticisms for both methods is that the whole procedure takes too
long.37 This is primarily due to the fact that the requests are given to
the government of the receiving country—that is, the country that
has jurisdiction over the location of the server holding the data in
question—which will then go through additional procedures to
safeguard against unlawful disclosure of private information. 38 On
average, it takes approximately 10 months for the United States to
respond to an MLA request.39 Processing of the MLA requests sent
In civil cases, “non-government litigants who do not have access to the
MLAT process” may use letters rogatory as a method to collect evidence from
another country. T. Markus Funk, Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties and Letters
Rogatory: A Guide for Judges, FED. JUD. CTR., at 17 (2014),
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2017/MLAT-LR-Guide-Funk-FJC2014.pdf. Letters rogatory and the MLAT process is not within the scope of this
Article, and, thus, their procedures will not be discussed in detail. For more
detailed discussion of the two methods and their procedures, see generally Funk,
supra note 36; see also Mulligan, supra note 6.
37
See Mulligan, supra note 6.
38
See id. at 12.
39
Richard A Clarke et al., Liberty and Security in a Changing World: Report
and Recommendations of the President’s Review Group on Intelligence and
Communications
Technologies,
at
227
(Dec.
12,
2013),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-1236
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to another country by the U.S. government may take “considerably
longer,” if it is ever completed.40
2. ECPA and the SCA
In 1986, Congress enacted ECPA, “one of the primary federal
laws regulating disclosure of electronic communications.” 41 It
protects any type of electronic communications—including emails,
phone conversations, and data in general—that are made,
transmitted, or stored.42 The more relevant chapter of ECPA is Title
II of the statute: the SCA. The SCA “protects the privacy of the
contents of files stored by service providers and of records held by
the subscriber by service providers . . . .”43 It has been interpreted
by the courts to apply to data associated with emails, 44 text
messages, 45 private messages, wall postings, and other comments
made on or via social media sites, 46 and even private YouTube
videos.47
Overall, the SCA has two major components. First, unless
exceptions indicated apply, the communications service providers
(“CSPs”) 48 are prohibited from “knowingly divulg[ing] to any
12_rg_final_report.pdf; see also U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., supra note 4, at 2 (“Our
foreign partners have long expressed concerns that the mutual legal assistance
process is too cumbersome to handle their growing needs for this type of
electronic evidence in a timely manner.”).
40
Mulligan, supra note 6, at 14.
41
Id. at 3.
42
See Office of Just. Programs, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., Electronic
Communications
Privacy
Act
of
1986,
https://it.ojp.gov/PrivacyLiberty/authorities/statutes/1285 (Apr. 23, 2019).
43
Id.
44
See Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004).
45
See Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., Inc., 529 F.3d 892, 901 (9th Cir.
2008), rev’d on Fourth Amendment grounds sub nom. City of Ontario, Cal. v.
Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010).
46
See Crispin v. Christian Audigier, 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 980, 989 (C.D. Cal.
2010).
47
See Viacom Intern. Inc. v. Youtube Inc., 253 F.R.D. 256, 264 (S.D.N.Y.
2008).
48
The SCA distinguishes between a person or entity “providing an electronic
communication service to the public,” 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1), and a person or
entity “providing remote computing service to the public.” 18 U.S.C. §
2702(a)(2). For the purpose of this Article, however, the difference is insignificant
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person or entity the contents of a communication while in electronic
storage by that service” and “contents of any communication which
is carried or maintained on that service.”49 Second, the SCA requires
disclosure of such data to the U.S. government, under certain
circumstances when a judicial warrant is successfully obtained. 50
While the SCA has been a major tool utilized by the U.S.
government to obtain electronic evidence, the statute’s
extraterritorial application became an issue in United States v.
Microsoft.51
B. The Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act
The extraterritorial application of the SCA became an issue
when Microsoft refused to hand over certain data that were stored in
Ireland which the U.S. government sought as part of a criminal
investigations. Section I.B.1 briefly discusses the history behind the
enactment of the CLOUD Act, which shows that Congress indeed
attempted to solve the core issue in Microsoft but did so in haste.
The result is somewhat unclear languages within the new law, hence
uncertainties introduced above and further analyzed in Section
I.B.2.
1. United States v. Microsoft Corp.
In 2016, the U.S. government, in accordance with the SCA
provisions, obtained a warrant from a magistrate judge requiring
Microsoft to disclose relevant contents of an email account that was
allegedly used by a suspect engaged in illegal drug trafficking. 52 The
since, today, major CSPs provide both services. Thus, “CSPs” will refer to both
types of providers in this Article.
49
18 U.S.C. § 2702(a).
50
See 18 U.S.C. § 2703. The SCA requires the U.S. government to obtain a
judicial warrant upon showing probable cause. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). However,
it should be noted that there are many different factors to be considered, such as
when and what the government can demand when it comes to communication data
from the CSPs, which will not be discussed here. For detailed discussions about
which factors that must be taken into account and specific procedures to be taken
for such mandatory disclosure, see Mulligan, supra note 6, at 5-6.
51
138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018).
52
Id. at 1187.
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warrant ordered Microsoft to disclose all relevant communication
data “[t]o the extent that the information . . . is within [Microsoft’s]
possession, custody, or control.” 53 While Microsoft partially
complied by providing relevant data that was stored within the
United States, it moved to quash the warrant with respect to the
information stored in Ireland. 54 After the magistrate judge denied
the motion, the District Court affirmed the ruling. 55 On appeal by
the United States, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed, holding that requiring Microsoft to disclose the electronic
communications in a foreign territory would be an unauthorized
extraterritorial application of § 2730 of the SCA.56 In concluding so,
the Second Circuit also emphasized that legislative history suggests
that the primary purpose of their enactment was the protection of
data privacy, which trumps the investigatory needs of law
enforcement. 57 The Supreme Court granted writ of certiorari on
October 16, 2017.58 The case drew public attention, and numerous
amici briefs were submitted by “a range of groups including privacy
advocates, law enforcement officials, members of Congress, 34 U.S.
states and territories, and several foreign nations.” 59

Id.
See Microsoft Search Warrant Case, at 200.
55
Id. at 201.
56
Id. at 222.
57
Id. at 219-20 (“In enacting the SCA, Congress expressed a concern that
developments in technology could erode the privacy interest that Americans
traditionally enjoyed in their records and communications . . . . Accordingly,
Congress set out to erect a set of statutory protections for stored electronic
communications . . . . In regard to governmental access, Congress sought to ensure
that the protections traditionally afforded by the Fourth Amendment extended to
the electronic forum . . . . We believe this legislative history tends to confirm our
view that the Act’s privacy provisions were its impetus and focus. Although
Congress did not overlook law enforcement needs in formulating the statute,
neither were those needs the primary motivator for the enactment . . . . Taken as
a whole, the legislative history tends to confirm our view that the focus of the
SCA’s warrant provisions is on protecting user’s privacy interests in stored
communications.”) (emphasis added).
58
Amy Howe, Court Adds Four New Cases to Merits Docket, SCOTUSBLOG
(Oct. 16, 2017, 11:55 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2017/10/court-addsfour-new-cases-merits-docket/.
59
Mulligan, supra note 6, at 7.
53
54
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While the appeal to the Supreme Court was pending, the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ) sought action from Congress. 60 In a
hearing before the House Committee on the Judiciary in June 2017,
DOJ representatives argued that the Second Circuit’s decision
curtailed law enforcement’s ability to obtain data stored by U.S.based CSPs abroad, which, consequently, causes harm to public
safety. 61 In February 2018, a bill titled the CLOUD Act, which
“revised portions of the SCA to explicitly permit the use of warrant
to obtain electronic communications stored by a U.S. company on
foreign servers,” 62 was introduced, passed in the House and the
Senate, and signed into law by the President on March 23, 2018.
Consequently, the Supreme Court rendered the Microsoft case
moot.63
2. Statutory Analysis of the CLOUD Act
In April 2019, DOJ indicated that the purpose of the CLOUD
Act was “to speed access to electronic information held by U.S.
based global providers that is critical to our foreign partners’
investigations of serious crime” wherever the data server may be
located. 64 Mainly, the CLOUD Act has two critical implications.
One, as mentioned above, the statute makes it explicit that the SCA
will apply to content data in possession of the CSPs regardless of
where the data server is located around the world.65 DOJ clarifies,
60

See Data Stored Abroad: Ensuring Lawful Access and Privacy Protection
in the digital Era: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 115th Cong.
1 (2017) (statement of Richard W. Downing, Acting Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen.,
U.S.
Dep’t
of
Just.),
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU00/20170615/106117/HHRG-115-JU00Wstate-DowningR-20170615.pdf.
61
Id.
62
Bilgic, supra note 2, at 332. The relevant statutory provision reads: “A
[CSP] shall comply with the obligations of [the SCA] to preserve, backup, or
disclose the contents of a wire or electronic communication and any record or
other information pertaining to a customer or subscriber within such provider’s
possession, custody, or control, regardless of whether such communication,
record, or other information is located within or outside of the United States.” 18
U.S.C. § 2713 (emphasis added).
63
See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186, 1188 (2018).
64
U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., supra note 4, at 2.
65
Id. at 6 (“[T]he second part of the CLOUD Act clarifies that U.S. law
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however, that the new “amendment . . . does not give U.S. law
enforcement any new legal authority to acquire data . . . .”66 Rather,
the amendment simply clarifies and confirms the extraterritorial
scope of the SCA.67
Two, the CLOUD Act authorizes the U.S. Attorney General,
with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to enter into
executive bilateral agreements with other countries that would
“remove restrictions under each country’s laws so that the CSPs can
comply with qualifying, lawful orders for electronic data issued by
the other country.” 68 In order to determine whether a foreign
government is eligible to enter into an executive agreement with the
U.S. government—or is a “qualifying foreign government” 69
(QFG)—the CLOUD Act requires that the Attorney General
consider different criteria and factors, such as implementation of
robust substantive and procedural laws against cybercrimes; on
electronic evidence; and on protection of privacy, civil liberties, and
international human rights.70
More relevant to this Article is the fact that a potential QFG must
show commitment and respect for “international human rights,
including . . . protection from arbitrary and unlawful interference
with privacy” 71 and “sufficient mechanisms to provide
accountability and appropriate transparency regarding the collection
and use of electronic data.”72 These are precisely the areas in which
the previous UK surveillance regime had been questioned and failed
to prevail in judicial challenges.73 Moreover, a QFG must also have
in place the procedures to “minimize the acquisition, retention, and

requires that CSPs subject to U.S. jurisdiction must disclose data that is responsive
to valid U.S. legal process, regardless of where the company stores the data.”).
66
Id. at 8.
67
Id. See also Mulligan, supra note 6, at 8 (stating that DOJ’s proposal to
Congress in the midst of the Microsoft case “was intended to restore the ‘preMicrosoft status quo when providers routinely complied’ with the SCA warrants
for data stored abroad.”).
68
U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., supra note 4, at 3.
69
Bilgic, supra note 2, at 336.
70
See 18 U.S.C. § 2523(b).
71
Id. § 2523(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I).
72
Id. § 2523(b)(1)(B)(v).
73
See infra Section II.A.2.

2020]

U.S.-UK EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT

261

dissemination of information concerning United States persons.” 74
For one, it is unclear how the United Kingdom has established such
system, and, thus, satisfies this category in the eyes of the U.S.
Attorney General. But even if the country has successfully put such
a system in place, discussion of incidental collection under FISA,
which compels the U.S. law enforcement agencies to do the same,
shows that this may not be enough to protect the data privacy of U.S.
citizens.75
There are also limitations outlined in the CLOUD Act for a QFG.
In general, the statute does not create any obligation for the CSPs to
decrypt any encrypted data transmitted to the QFG, or even to retain
the technology to do so.76 The CLOUD Act also amends the original
text of 18 U.S.C. § 2703 by allowing the CSPs that have been issued
a judicial order forcing them to hand over certain data to make
Motions to Quash or Modify the court order. 77 In order to succeed
in such motions in the United States, the CSPs must conjunctively
establish that the targeted person is a non-U.S. person who does not
reside in the United States, and that the disclosure would violate the
national laws of the QFG.78 The courts may modify or quash the
motion only if that they believe that the motion should be granted in
consideration of interests of justice in totality of the circumstances,
in addition to finding that the CSPs have satisfied its burden of
proof.79 However, the courts may still force immediate production
of requested data while the order is being challenged if the delay
would cause an “adverse result identified in Section 2705(a)(2).” 80
Other limitations are similar, if not almost identical, to
provisions in FISA. For instance, the QFG may not intentionally
seek or obtain data of U.S. citizens and persons located within the
U.S. borders, or achieve this by targeting a foreigner located outside
Id. § 2523(b)(2).
See infra Section II.A.1.
76
Id. § 2523(b)(3).
77
See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(h)(2)(A).
78
Id. § 2703(h)(2)(B). It should be noted that the CLOUD Act itself only
seem to specify the procedures and the standards applicable in the U.S. courts but
not the courts of the QFGs. See infra note 229.
79
The CLOUD Act dictates that the court considering such Motion to Quash
or Modify should consider international comity among other elements. See id. §
2703(h)(3).
80
Id. § 2703(h)(4).
74

75
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the United States.81 Furthermore, the order issued by a QFG must be
solely to obtain data related to a serious crime.82 The court orders
must be subject to review by an independent judicial or another
authority,83 and abide by other restrictions on wire tapping similar
to those under FISA. 84 The QFG may not issue an order on behalf
of the United States for data disclosure nor “be required to share any
information produced with the United States Government.” 85
C. Assessment of the CLOUD Act by Foreign Authorities
While there have been many speculations on the practicality of
the CLOUD Act for some time after its enactment, the European
Data Protection Board (EDPB) of the European Union (EU) and the
Law Council of Australia (LCA) presented clarifying views on the
CLOUD Act’s compatibility with their own respective equivalent
laws. Simply put, the requirements under the CLOUD Act are “too
hard” in comparison to the Australian law and “too soft” for the
EU.86 The compatibility assessment against the laws of the EU and
Australia will be discussed for the purpose of showing the thinness
of the CLOUD Act—a product of Congress’ rush to answer the
Second Circuit’s decision in Microsoft.

18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(4)(A), (B).
Id. § 2523(b)(4)(D)(i).
83
Id. § 2523(b)(4)(D)(v).
84
See id. § 2523(b)(4)(D)(vi) (“[A]n order [issued by the QFG] for the
interception of wire or electronic communications . . . shall require that the
interception order . . . be for a fixed, limited duration . . . , may not last longer than
is reasonably necessary to accomplish the approved purpose of the order . . . , and
be issued only if the same information could not reasonably be obtained by
another less intrusive method.”). Cf. 50 U.S.C. § 1805 (specifying the
requirements, as to duration, for example, to be met for a court order under FISA).
85
Id. § 2523(b)(4)(C).
86
Marcus Evans et al., US Cloud Act and International Privacy, NORTON
ROSE FULBRIGHT: DATA PROTECTION REP.
(Aug.
1,
2019),
https://www.dataprotectionreport.com/2019/08/u-s-cloud-act-and-internationalprivacy/.
81
82
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1. The European Union and the GDPR
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) of the EU
became binding on all member states as of May 25, 2018.87 Written
by the European Parliament and the Council of the EU, the GDPR
was implemented “not only to enhance and safeguard the rights that
individuals have over their data but . . . to create a simple and
efficient regulatory environment, where compliance with the
regulation is a key element, not only for public sector, but also for
private businesses.”88
On July 10, 2019, the EDPB and the European Data Protection
Supervisor (EDPS) issued an initial assessment of the CLOUD Act
in relation to the GDPR.89 They concluded that a U.S.-based CSP
active in the European market would not be able to transfer data to
the U.S. government under the CLOUD Act without violating the
GDPR. 90 The main obstacle, the two entities claim, is the
incompatibility between the requests under the CLOUD Act and
Articles 6, 48, and 49 of the GDPR.91

Directive 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of April
27, 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive
95/46/EC,
2016
O.J.
(L
119),
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?qid=1528874672298&uri=CELEX%3A32016R0679
[hereinafter GDPR].
88
Georgios Roussaris, EU Policies in Data Governance: The New Challenge
on
the
Field
of
Public
Administration,
at
26
(2019),
https://dspace.lib.uom.gr/bitstream/2159/23080/4/RoussarisGeorgiosMsc2019.p
df.; see also Data Governance: Landscape Review, THE ROYAL SOCIETY, at 9
(June
2017),
https://royalsociety.org/~/media/policy/projects/datagovernance/data-governance-landscape-review.pdf.
89
See European Data Protection Board (EDPB), ANNEX. Initial Legal
Assessment of the Impact of the US CLOUD Act on the EU Legal Framework for
the Protection of Personal Data and the Negotiations of an EU-US Agreement on
Cross-border Access to Electronic Evidence (July 10, 2019),
https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/files/files/file2/edpb_edps_joint_response_us_
cloudact_annex.pdf.
90
Id.
91
It should be noted that the EDPB stated that there may be certain
exceptions. See id. n.18 (“The European Commission takes the view that some
derogations under Article 49 GDPR might be used, depending on the
circumstances of the case.”).
87
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First, Article 48 of the GDPR requires that a judicial or an
administrative order requesting disclosure of personal data from a
CSP within the EU “may only be recognized or enforceable in any
manner if based on an international agreement.” 92 Since executive
agreements under the CLOUD Act are not treated as such
international agreement by the EU,93 the CSPs will not be able to
transfer personal data to the U.S. government under the CLOUD Act
without violating Article 48, unless there is “another legal basis
under the GDPR.”94
Second, Article 6(1)(c) requires that the data transfer be
“necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the [CSP]
is subject.”95 However, because “legal obligation” in this context
can only have basis under the law of the EU or the Member States, 96
a CLOUD Act-based request would create legal obligations for a
CSP only if the EU enters into a separate international agreement
with the United States under Article 48. 97 Neither would such
request have legal basis under Article 6(1)(e) 98 for the same
reasons.99 Additionally, although Article 6(1)(d) may allow transfer
of personal data “in order to protect the vital interests of the data
subject or of another natural person,”100 the GDPR states that the
transfers for the latter purpose should take place only when there is
no other legal basis for doing so. 101 Consequently, while data
GDPR, art. 48.
While Article 48 of the GDPR explicitly states that an MLAT between the
EU and another country will suffice, it seems that an executive agreement with
the United States under the CLOUD Act will not be treated as an “international
agreement” under Article 48. See EDPB, supra note 89, at 3.
94
Id.
95
GDPR, art. 6(1)(c).
96
Id. art. 6(3).
97
See EDPB, supra note 89, at 4.
98
See GDPR, art. 6(1)(e) (“Processing shall be lawful only if . . . processing
is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in
the exercise of official authority vested in the controller.”).
99
See EDPB, supra note 89, at 4-5 (“We consider that Article 6(1)(e) may
not constitute a valid legal basis [because] where processing is necessary for the
performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official
authority, according to Article 6(3) GDPR, the processing should have basis in
Union or Member State law.”).
100
GDPR, art. 6(1)(d).
101
See GDPR, recital 46. (“Processing of personal data based on vital interest
92
93
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transfer may be lawful if its purpose was to protect the vital interest
of the data subject, the same cannot be said for “another natural
person” because the EU-US MLAT is a valid alternative legal basis
for requesting such information. 102 Lastly, data transfers may be
lawful under Article 6(1)(f)103 only if the legitimate interests of the
CSPs or those of the U.S. government outweigh the interests or
fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject.104 In evaluating
the balancing test, the EDPB and the EDPS clarify that the U.S.
government is “not [one of the] public or competent authorities
established under EU Law,” and, thus, cannot fall within the
definition of “third party” for the purposes of Article 6(1)(f); the
latter element of the balancing test will likely override the former
due to potential violation of data subject’s right to effective remedy,
the principle of dual criminality, and circumstances in which the
CSPs will need to act on the basis of limited information. 105
Finally, the EDPB and the EDPS discussed whether disclosure
of data under the CLOUD Act would be compatible under Article
49: Derogations for Specific Situations. 106 They answered in the
negative. The legality of such transfer under Article 49(1)(d) 107 is
rejected because “only public interests recognised in Union law or
in the law of the Member State to which the controller is subject can
lead to the application of this derogation,” and that of the United
States is not relevant. 108 It is conceded that data transfer may be
lawful under Article 49(1)(e) 109 under certain circumstances. 110
of another natural person should in principle take place only where the processing
cannot be manifestly based on another legal basis.”).
102
See EDPB, supra note 89.
103
See GDPR, art. 6(1)(f) (“Processing shall be lawful only if . . . processing
is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller
or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or
fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of
personal data.”).
104
See EDPB, supra note 89, at 5.
105
Id. at 5-6.
106
GDPR, art. 49.
107
Id. art. 49(1)(d) (“. . . the transfer is necessary for important reasons of
public interest . . .”).
108
See EDPB, supra note 89, at 6.
109
See GDPR, art. 49(1)(e) (“. . . transfer is necessary for the establishment,
exercise or defense of legal claims . . .”).
110
See EDPB, supra note 89, at 6.
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However, “a close link is necessary between the data transfer and a
specific procedure . . . and the derogation cannot be used to justify
the [data] transfer . . . on the grounds of the mere possibility that
legal proceedings may be brought in the future.” 111 Likewise,
possibility of data transfer under Article 49(1)(f) is also dismissed
under the same reasoning mentioned above for Article 6(1)(d). 112
Lastly, the EDPB and the EDPS declared that the last paragraph of
Article 49(1) “cannot provide a valid lawful ground to transfer
personal data on the basis of [the] US CLOUD Act requests” mainly
because, in addition to the balancing test imposed under Article
6(1)(f), the CSPs who are transferring the data must “notify both the
supervisory authority and the data subject[, which] appears
incompatible with ‘protective orders’ often joined to [the] US
CLOUD Act warrants, which aim at maintaining the secrecy of the
request (in order to avoid compromising the investigation).” 113
2. Australia and the Assistance and Access Act
On December 9, 2018, the Australian government enacted a new
legislation—the Assistance and Access Act (AAA) 114 —“to
facilitate law enforcement access to data” and address problems
associated with “cross-nature of investigations involving digital
evidence.” 115 The relevant provisions “specif[y] in detail the
Id. at 6-7.
See GDPR, art. 49(1)(f) (“In the absence of an adequacy decision [or of
appropriate safeguards], a transfer or a set of transfers of personal data to a third
country or an international organisation shall take place only on one of the
following conditions . . . (f) the transfer is necessary in order to protect the vital
interests of the data subject or of other persons, where the data subject is
physically or legally incapable of giving consent.”).
The EDPB and EDPS clarifies that the “circumstance that data subjects
should be physically or legally incapable of giving consent . . . may not exclude
situations where the data subject is constituting an imminent threat to the life and
physical integrity of other persons, providing that sufficient information is
provided to establish the validity of transfer in such circumstances.” EDPB, supra
note 89, at 7.
113
See EDPB, supra note 89, at 7.
114
See Assistance and Access Act 2018 (Cth) ss 43A, 43B (Austl.),
https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/legislation/bills/r6195_aspassed/t
oc_pdf/18204b01.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf.
115
Jennifer Daskal, Privacy and Security Across Borders, 128 YALE L.J. 1029,
111
112
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requirements that apply if and when the government . . . accesses a
computer or data known to be located across borders.” 116
The LCA identified three issues with the CLOUD Act, two of
which seem to be more problematic and, thus, may prevent Australia
from entering into an executive agreement with the United States
under the CLOUD Act: (1) the lack of the enforcement of decryption
on the CSPs, and (2) the requirement of review or oversight by the
judicial or other independent authority. 117 More specifically, the
CLOUD Act makes clear that the executive agreements cannot
enforce an obligation on a CSP capable of decrypting data to do
so. 118 But the AAA allows the Australian law enforcements to
require the CSPs to decrypt private communications for criminal
investigation purposes in certain situations. 119 In regards to the other
incompatibility, the order issued by the QFG under the CLOUD Act
must be “subject to review or oversight by a court, judge, magistrate,
or other independent authority prior to, or in proceedings regarding,
enforcement of the order.”120 However, the AAA “does not provide
sufficient requirements for the independent judicial oversight” of the
issuance of such orders.121
1031 (2018-2019).
116
Id.
117
See Law Council of Australia (LCA), Review of the amendments made by
the Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and
Access)
Act
2018
(Cth),
8
(July
16,
2019),
https://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/docs/e3857998-50d8-e911-9400005056be13b5/3646%20%20Review%20of%20the%20amendments%20made%20by%20the%20Assista
nce%20and%20Access%20Act.pdf.
118
18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(3) (“[T]he terms of the [executive] agreement shall
not create any obligation that providers be capable of decryption data or limitation
that prevents providers from decrypting data.”).
119
See Explanatory Memorandum, Telecommunications and Other
Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Bill 2018 (Cth) (Austl.),
https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/legislation/ems/r6195_ems_1139b
fde-17f3-4538-b2b25875f5881239/upload_pdf/685255.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf.
120
18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(4)(D)(v).
121
LCA, supra note 117, at 9. The Law Council of Australia notes that while
the Technical Assistance Notices (TAN) and Technical Capability Notices
(TCN)—which are equivalent of orders—require supervision of the Attorney
General, the Attorney General is not an independent party as a member of the
Executive Branch. For detailed discussions of TAN and TCN, see Law Council
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Thus, the LCA, in its submission to the Australian Parliament,
concluded that Australia, with its current legislation, will not qualify
for an executive agreement with the United States under the
CLOUD Act. 122 To be sure, these are incompatibilities under the
current laws as they stand. That is to say, both parties will be able to
agree on modified terms in an executive agreement. As of October
7, 2019, the United States and Australia have released a joint
statement indicating that negotiations under the CLOUD Act are
underway.123
D. U.S.-UK Executive Agreement of 2019
On the other hand, the United Kingdom has been a fervent
supporter of the CLOUD Act, and it came with no surprise that it
was the first country to have entered into an Executive Agreement
under the statute.124 In fact, the two countries had been negotiating
a similar agreement even before the CLOUD Act was signed into
law.125 Section I.D.1 will briefly touch on the terms of the Executive
Agreement that are relevant for the purposes of this Article.

of Australia, Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance
and
Access)
Bill
2018
(Oct.
18,
2018),
https://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/docs/508b2589-9ed2-e811-93fc005056be13b5/3530%20%20Telecommunications%20and%20Other%20Legislation%20Amendment%2
0Assistance%20and%20Access%20Bill%202018.pdf.
122
See LCA, supra note 117, at 8.
123
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Joint Statement Announcing United
States and Australian Negotiation of a CLOUD Act Agreement by U.S. Attorney
General William Barr and Minister for Home Affairs Peter Dutton (Oct. 7, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/joint-statement-announcing-united-states-andaustralian-negotiation-cloud-act-agreement-us.
124
Drew Mitnick, What Happened with the CLOUD Act (and What Comes
Next), ACCESS NOW (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.accessnow.org/whathappened-with-the-cloud-act-and-what-comes-next/ (“The first country that the
U.S. will likely reach an agreement with is the United Kingdom . . .”).
125
See Ellen Nakashima & Andrea Peterson, The British Wants to Come to
America – with Wiretap Orders and Search Warrants, THE WASH. POST (Feb. 4,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/the-britishwant-to-come-to-america--with-wiretap-orders-and-searchwarrants/2016/02/04/b351ce9e-ca86-11e5-a7b2-5a2f824b02c9_story.html.
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1. Relevant Sections of the Executive Agreement
DOJ emphasized that the Executive Agreement was recognized
as necessary by both parties in order to fight “serious crimes.”126
The Executive Agreement is to be entered into force after a 180-day
Congressional review period as required by the CLOUD Act. 127
First, Article 1(16) limits the scope of the application of the
Agreement to data that are used or controlled by a “Covered Person”
but not by any “Receiving Party.”128 Article 1(12) clarifies that a
“Receiving Party Person” is essentially a citizen, a permanent
resident, or a government official of the United States129 or that of
the United Kingdom, or a corporation or any other person within the
United Kingdom. 130 These two articles imply that the Executive
Agreement, on its face, does not authorize the UK government to
gather information involving U.S. citizens, either directly or
indirectly.
When the UK or the U.S. government issues an order requesting
relevant data from the CSPs within their jurisdictions, only their
respective domestic laws apply.131 This means that no laws of the
United States will be relevant or applicable to the UK government’s
request for information from the U.S.-based CSPs within its borders.
Article 5 of the Agreement speaks to the requirement of
“reasonable justification” in issuance of the orders and their judicial
oversight by the UK courts.132 Article 5(4) does not allow for orders
that are issued for the purpose of disclosing information to the U.S.
or a third-party government. 133 Articles 5(11), (12) elaborate on
procedures through which the CSPs may object to such orders if
they believe the order is inappropriate.134 Essentially, a CSP may
U.S. Dep’t of Just., supra note 20 (“Attorney General William Barr said:
“This agreement will enhance the ability of the United States and the United
Kingdom to fight serious crime—including terrorism, transnational organized
crime, and child exploitation . . . .”).
127
See 18 U.S.C. § 2523(d)(4). But see infra note 235.
128
See U.S.-UK/Ir. Executive Agreement, supra note 28.
129
Id. art. 1(16).
130
Id. art. 1(12).
131
Id. art. 3(2).
132
Id. art. 5(1), (2).
133
Id. art. 5(4).
134
Id. art. 5(11), (12). See also infra notes 228-231 and accompanying texts.
126
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object to the UK government’s order, and if the two parties cannot
resolve the issue, then the U.S. government will step in to evaluate
the appropriateness of the order. If the U.S. government agrees with
the objecting CSP, then the latter party will have no obligation to
disclose any information to the UK government.
The most relevant part of the Agreement is Article 7: Targeting
and Minimization Procedures, which takes a similar form of § 702
of FISA.135 Article 7 requires the United Kingdom to “adopt and
implement appropriate procedures to minimize” incidentally
obtaining data of U.S. citizens while collecting data of a target
person under its judicial order, i.e., incidental collection of such data.
Article 7(3) requires the UK government to “segregate, seal, or
delete, and not disseminate” such data that is not necessary to the
criminal investigation and prosecution of the “Covered Person.” 136
Putting aside the difficulty of segregating data in general, the
agreement does not elaborate on what constitutes “necessary,”
which is left for interpretation by the UK government. Article 7(5)
requires that such data not be transmitted to the U.S. government
unless it “relates to significant harm [or] threat to the United
States.”137 Again, the Executive Agreement does not go far enough
to define the extents of “relates” and “significant harm.” However,
the existence of Article 7(5) indicates that both parties recognize that
the possibility of incidental collection of data is real and high, if not
inevitable.
Lastly, according to the Executive Agreement, the United
Kingdom does not require permission to use data obtained unless it
raises freedom of speech concerns, and the United States needs to
seek permission from the UK government only if the data obtained
from a CSP server in the United Kingdom would be used for an
offense that may result in the death penalty. 138

135

See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h); see also infra notes 144-147 and accompanying

text.
136

See U.S.-UK/Ir. Executive Agreement, supra note 28, art. 7(3).
Id. art. 7(5).
138
Id. art. 8(4).
137
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II. POTENTIAL JEOPARDY TO THE DATA PRIVACY OF U.S. CITIZENS
Having been enacted as part of an omnibus spending bill with
haste,139 the CLOUD Act includes gaps, some of which have been
identified by foreign entities in Section I.C. Given the transnational
nature of cross-border data transfers, the statute should have
included details that would fill in such cracks. While the Executive
Agreement does include terms that attempt to make whole the
deficiencies, it does not provide adequate protection against
incidental data collection. Part II argues that the possibility of
incidental collection of data belonging to U.S. citizens is at least
probable, if not certain. Section II.A, using FISA as a vehicle,
identifies ways in which this could happen under the Executive
Agreement. Section II.B discusses how this could happen under the
UK laws that are arguably less than adequate to protect data privacy
of individuals.
A. Incidental Collection of Data of Non-target Citizens
Incidental collection of data refers to the collection of data
belonging to those who are not the target of criminal
investigations.140 For example, if the government is seeking private
data of Citizen A—the target—and such data includes conversations
between A and B, then data of B may be “incidentally” collected
during the evidence gathering. Then, the data belonging to B would
be entered into the database of the governmental organizations who
are free to search within the database as long as any data sought is
related to the investigation.141
Such incidental collection is nothing new. In fact, the
government’s recognition of its possibility is reflected in many
regulations, including FISA and the CLOUD Act as well as the
Executive Agreement. 142 More specifically, this is shown in §§
2523(b)(2), (b)(4)(D)(vi)(G) and (H), as amended by the CLOUD
Act, and Article 7 of the Executive Agreement which is written

139

See Davis & Gressel, supra note 8.
See generally BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., supra note 27.
141
Id.
142
See infra note 143.
140
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almost in verbatim. 143 In Section II.A.1, FISA will be discussed
because it illustrates the authorities given to governmental agencies
that lead to incidental collections. The statute also includes
provisions and structures that parallel those of the CLOUD Act and
the Executive Agreement. Section II.A.2 provides a brief overview
of the history of the UK surveillance laws that led to the current
Investigatory Powers Act, which serves as the legal basis for the
Executive Agreement for the European country.
1. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
As amended in 2008, § 702 of FISA authorizes the U.S.
government to collect electronic communications of foreigners
located outside of the United States from the CSPs if the data is
related to national security or other serious crimes. 144 However,
FISA mandates that data acquisition under § 702 must be consistent
with the Fourth Amendment, and forbids the U.S. government from

§ 2523(b)(2) requires that a qualifying foreign government to have
“adopted appropriate procedures to minimize the acquisition, retention, and
dissemination of information concerning United States persons subject to the
agreement.”
Additionally, § 2523(b)(4)(D)(vi)(G) requires the foreign government,
“using procedures that, to the maximum extent possible, meet the definition of
minimization procedures in Section 101 of [FISA], segregate, seal, or delete, and
no disseminate material found not to be information that is, or is necessary to
understand or assess the importance of information that is, relevant to the
prevention, detection, investigation, or prosecution of serious crime, including
terrorism, or necessary to protect against a threat of death or serious bodily injury
harm to any person.”
Finally, § 2523(b)(4)(D)(vi)(H) states that the qualifying foreign government
“may not disseminate the content of a communication of a United States person
to United States authorities unless the communication may be disseminated
pursuant to subparagraph (G) and relates to significant harm, or the threat thereof,
to the United States or United States persons including crimes involving national
security such as terrorism significant violent crime, child exploitation
transnational organized crime, or significant financial fraud.”
Indeed, the U.S.-UK/Ir. Executive Agreement includes similar languages.
See U.S.-UK/Ir. Executive Agreement, supra note 28; see also infra notes 144147 and accompanying texts.
144
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008 §
702, 50 U.S.C. § 1881 (2008) [hereinafter FISA].
143
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intentionally targeting data that belongs to U.S. citizens. 145 FISA
also includes a provision on “minimization procedures” which is
aimed to curtail the acquisition, retention, and dissemination of data
of U.S. citizens that are collected unintentionally—or
incidentally.146 If collected, data of U.S. citizens may not be used in
criminal proceedings unless certain exceptions apply. 147
Many FISA provisions are similar to those in the CLOUD Act
as well as the Executive Agreement. Some distinctions are just as
apparent, however. For one, under FISA, initial certification
submitted by the Attorney General for collection of data under § 702
is subject to review by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
(FISC) to ensure that the certification is consistent with the Fourth
Amendment. 148 On the other hand, the CLOUD Act and the
Executive Agreement only require that the judicial order of the UK
courts reflect “reasonable justification” based on the facts presented
to them.149
Incidental collection can happen in two ways under § 702:
downstream collection and upstream collection. Downstream
collection, also known as the PRISM program, is when government
agencies collect data from the CSPs if “communications contain
certain terms chosen by the [National Security Agency].” 150
Upstream collection refers to massive data gathering by the National
Security Agency directly from the internet which are transmitted
through “domestic and international fiber optic cables.” 151 This
method allows for bulk data collection by the agency which may
contain communications data of those other than the targeted

See id. § 1881a(b).
See id. § 1801(h).
147
The use of incidentally collected data of U.S. citizens in criminal
proceedings, while is an important issue, is beyond the scope of this paper, which
is merely exploring the problems of similar collection in order to parallel the
problem in the circumstances of the UK. For statutory language on how such data
may be used in criminal proceedings, see id. § 1806.
148
See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1805(a)(2)(A), (b).
149
See supra, note 132.
150
Ioanna Tourkochoriti, The Transatlantic Flow of Data and the National
Security Exception in the European Data Privacy Regulation: In Search for Legal
Protection Against Surveillance, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L., 459, 462-463 (2014).
151
Id. at 463.
145
146
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persons. 152 Collected data is entered into a database routinely
searched by government entities. 153 The agencies do not need a
warrant to search the existing database, a practice is coined as
“backdoor searches” 154 since they would need to show probable
cause otherwise.155
Incidental collection of bulk data belonging to U.S. citizens
under FISA is an ongoing problem. On October 18, 2019, the FISC
released an opinion on the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI)’s
use of its authority under § 702. 156 The opinion shows that such
incidental collection is not-so incidental. In sum, the court found that
the “querying procedures and minimization procedures [of the FBI]
do not comply with the requirement at Section 702(f)(1)(B) [and] to
be inconsistent with statutory minimization requirements and the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment,” particularly in relation to
the use of backdoor searches.157 Thus, even with the safeguards of
annual judicial review and attempts to enforce the probable cause
standard, the data of U.S. citizens has not been adequately protected
by, but rather been exposed to, the U.S. government. Nonetheless,
the FISC approved the data collection certification of the FBI in
question, after the latter submitted amended certifications to explain
why they are acquiring certain data.158

152
Sneha Indrajit et al., FISA’s Section 702 & the Privacy Conundrum:
Surveillance in the U.S. and Globally, THE HENRY M. JACKSON SCH. OF INT’L
STUD. (Oct. 25, 2017), https://jsis.washington.edu/news/controversycomparisons-data-collection-fisas-section-702/.
153
Backdoor
Search,
ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER
FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/pages/backdoor-search.
154
Id.
155
Brittany Adams, Striking a Balance: Privacy and National Security in
Section 702 U.S Person Queries, 94 WASH. L. REV. 401, 404 (2019).
156
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, Documents Regarding the
Section
702
2018
Certification
(Oct.
18,
2018),
https://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/
2018_Cert_FISC_Opin_18Oct18.pdf.
157
Id.
158
Aaron Mackey & Andrew Crocker, Secret Court Rules that the FBI’s
“Backdoor Searches” of Americans Violated the Fourth Amendment,
ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER
FOUND.
(Oct.
11,
2019),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/10/secret-court-rules-fbis-backdoorsearches-americans-violated-fourth-amendment.
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Seeing as how even the Fourth Amendment does not seem to
provide enough protection to data privacy, it is easy to imagine a
situation where with a lesser stringent standard, violation of privacy
rights may happen in a more consistent basis. This has been the key
controversy surrounding the surveillance laws of the United
Kingdom.
2. UK Public Surveillance Laws
The UK government has had its public surveillance laws
challenged on numerous occasions. The UK surveillance regime has
its roots in § 94 of the Telecommunications Act of 1984, which gave
the government the authority to force communications providers to
retain and provide relevant data.159 This power had been used for
decades by the government to collect data in bulk without any
independent oversight.160 A similar tool used by the UK government
is the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act of 2000 (RIPA),
which authorized the government to collect certain types of private
communication data without judicial oversight. 161 The product of
the government’s effort to supplement RIPA was the Data Retention
and Investigatory Powers Act of 2014 (DRIPA). 162 DRIPA
authorized the UK Secretary of State to compel communications
providers to retain data for any purpose in relation to §22(2) of

Telecommunications Act 1984, §§ 94(1), (2), (Eng.).
Alan Travis et al., Theresa May Unveils UK Surveillance Measures in
Wake of Snowden Claims, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 4, 2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/04/theresa-may-surveillancemeasures-edward-snowden.
161
Rubin S. Waranch, Digital Rights Ireland Deja Vu?: Why the Bulk
Acquisition Warrant Provisions of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 Are
Incompatible with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 50
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 209, 215 (2017); see also Regulation of Investigatory
Powers
Act
2000,
c.
23
(Eng.),
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/pdfs/ukpga_20000023_en.pdf.
162
See State Surveillance and Data Privacy: What Now?, EACHOTHER (Sept.
21, 2018), https://eachother.org.uk/state-surveillance-what-now/ (explaining that
DRIPA was passed after failed attempt by Home Secretary Theresa May to
introduce the Communications Data Bill that would “grant[] even wider
surveillance powers” than RIPA, a seemingly outdated law in light of recent
digital advancements).
159
160
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RIPA.163 After its expiration, DRIPA was struck down by the UK
Court of Appeals, following the Court of Justice of the European
Union (CJEU)’s judgement against it because of its inconsistencies
with the data retention laws of the EU and for the lack of
independent oversight. 164 For similar reasons, the Investigatory
Powers Tribunal 165 ruled that data collection implemented by the
government under DRIPA was not compatible with Article 8 of the
European Convention on Human Rights, which includes provisions
of individual’s fundamental right to protection of privacy. 166
The most recent statute that grants the UK government similar,
and arguably more expansive, authority to seek citizens’ data for
national security purposes is the Investigatory Powers Act (IPA),
passed in 2016. 167 At the time of enactment, the IPA authorized
governmental agencies to collect bulk of communications data,
rather than only those of targeted individuals, upon approval by the
Secretary of State. 168 The IPA went through some amending in
2018, during which the government conceded that DRIPA was
inconsistent with the EU law because not all of the data retained was
for the purpose of fighting “serious crime,” their collection was not
subject to review by independent body, and the IPA originally had
provisions taken from DRIPA. 169 As amended, the IPA includes
163

See Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014, c. 27, § 1(1),

(Eng.).
164
Matt Burgess, The UK’s Mass Surveillance Laws Just Suffered Another
Hefty Blow, WIRED (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/uksurveillance-unlawful-watson-davis.
165
The Investigatory Powers Tribunal, established in 2000 as an independent
judicial tribunal under RIPA, is the equivalent of the FISC in the United States.
See General Overview and Background, THE INVESTIGATORY POWERS TRIB.
(July 5, 2016), https://www.ipt-uk.com/content.asp?id=10. However, the
Tribunal will not be discussed at length because, as of this writing, much of its
role has been transferred to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office
created by the more recent Investigatory Powers Act. See Who We Are,
INVESTIGATORY POWERS COMM’R’S OFF., https://www.ipco.org.uk/.
166
Privacy Int’l v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
[2016]
IPT
15,
110-CH
(Eng.),
https://www.iptuk.com/docs/Bulk_Data_Judgment.pdf; see also Matt Burgess, MI6, MI5 and
GCHQ ‘Unlawfully Collected Private Data for 10 Years’, WIRED (Oct. 17, 2016),
https://www.wired.co.uk/article/uk-collect-data-unlawful.
167
See IPA, supra note 23.
168
See Waranch, supra note 161, at 227.
169
Ian Cobain, UK Has Six Months to Rewrite Snooper’s Charter, High Court
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definitions of “serious crimes” 170 and created the Investigatory
Powers Commission (IPC)—a group of judges who provide
independent oversight of the process. 171 As of this writing, several
challenges to the IPA have not been successful in the UK Courts.172
B. Incidental Collection under the Executive Agreement
As mentioned above, governments themselves recognize that
incidental collection of non-target citizens is probable, if not
inevitable. FISA elaborates on minimization procedures to ensure
that incidentally collected data of U.S. citizens are not abused. 173
Likewise, the Executive Agreement includes provisions that the UK
government must abide by if data of U.S. citizens are incidentally
collected. More specifically, in regards to such data, the UK
government must evaluate whether the data is imperative to the
investigation and must destroy the data if not, and cannot hand over
such data to the U.S. government unless it is related to national
security of the United States.174 However, the IPA may create ways
in which the UK government not only collect but retain data that
belongs to U.S. citizens. This Section identifies two issues: the
limited oversight of bulk collection of data and the lack of probable
cause standard in the United Kingdom.

Rules,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Apr.
27,
2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/apr/27/snoopers-charterinvestigatory-powers-act-rewrite-high-court-rules.
170
The IPA defines “serious crime” as “offence, or one of the offences, which
is or would be constituted by the conduct concerned is an offence for which a
person who has reached the age of 18 . . . and has no previous convictions could
reasonably be expected to be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 3 years or
more [or where] the conduct involves use of violence, results in substantial
financial gain or is conduct by a large number of persons in pursuit of a common
purpose.” See IPA, supra note 23, § 263(1).
171
Id. c. 25.
172
See Carey, supra note 25.
173
See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h).
174
See U.S.-UK/Ir. Executive Agreement, supra note 28, art. 7(5).
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1. Bulk Data Collection
Traditionally, one common issue that has constantly been at the
center of controversy over the UK surveillance laws is the purpose
of data collections. In the past, certain local authorities had used
powers granted under RIPA for reasons that are not related to
national security or terrorism—to monitor dog barking, gather
evidence against those guilty of feeding pigeons, or checking up on
government benefit claimants, for example—as the statute itself
defines as its purpose.175 While these instances happened before the
enactment of the IPA, which supposedly has more stringent
requirement and oversight, they illustrate how the surveillance laws
can be abused without the knowledge of the public.
In Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger & Others, the CJEU
struck down the Data Retention Directive of the European Union 176
because the retention of data of citizens violated fundamental rights
to privacy illustrated in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights. 177 In its opinion, however, the CJEU did
acknowledge that preventing and prosecuting “serious crimes” is an
acceptable justification for collection and retention of data by
government authorities.178 In response to this judgement, the United
Kingdom passed DRIPA to provide a legal basis to continuously
force the CSPs to retain communications data of the citizens. Upon
its expiration, DRIPA was replaced by the IPA. 179
Under the IPA, in order for law enforcement agencies to obtain
a warrant for bulk acquisition, the UK Secretary of State must
Anushka Asthana, Revealed: British Councils Used RIPA to Secretly Spy
on
Public,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Dec.
25,
2016),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/25/british-councils-usedinvestigatory-powers-ripa-to-secretly-spy-on-public.
176
Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
15 March 2006 on the Retention of Data Generated or Processed in Connection
with the Provision of Publicly Available Electronic Communications Services or
of Public Communications Networks and Amending Directive 2002/58/EC, 2006
O.J. (L 105).
177
Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger
& Others, 2014 E.C.R. 238.
178
Id. ¶ 102.
179
David Fennelly, Data Retention: the Life, Death and Afterlife of a
Directive, J. ACAD. OF EUR. L. 673, 685 (2019), https://doi.org/10.1007/s12027018-0516-5.
175
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approve the warrant with a belief that the warrant is (1) in the interest
of national security, (2) for the purpose of preventing or detecting
serious crime, or (3) in the interest of economic well-being of the
United Kingdom as long as it relates to the interests of national
security. 180 The Secretary also needs to consider whether the
collection authorized by the warrant is proportionate to the purpose
it is sought to achieve. 181 Then, the judicial commission must
approve the warrant. In doing so, the commission is to determine
whether the warrant satisfies any of the three purposes mentioned
above as well as whether the scope of the warrant is proportionate
to what is sought to achieve.182
However, the IPA itself does not indicate which factors must be
taken into account in making such decisions, and, thus, provides
ample room for discretion of the Secretary. 183 For example, it does
not clarify what constitutes as “interest of national security” or
“economic well-being.” 184 This allows for much leeway in
validating an issuance of a warrant and broad inclusion of data to be
collected.185 In addition, the purposes identified by agencies in order
to obtain a warrant is, by its inherent nature, confidential. 186 As a
result, it will be difficult to examine what exactly were the reasons
cited in their requests for warrants permitting bulk data collection.
To be sure, the language of “national interest” and “serious
crime” is almost identical to the limitations set by the Executive
Agreement.187 But, assuming that bulk collection of data inevitably
exposes communications data that belong to U.S. citizens, the UK
government’s request for disclosure from U.S.-based CSPs may

See IPA, supra note 23, c. 25, §§ 158(1), (2).
Id. A comprehensive list of valid operational purposes shared by the
government shows broad spectrum of purposes that may potentially qualify for
issuance of such warrant. See Operational Case for Bulk Powers, GCHQ,
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/atta
chment_data/file/504187/Operational_Case_for_Bulk_Powers.pdf.
182
See IPA, supra note 23, c. 25, §§ 23, 140, 159.
183
See Waranch, supra note 161, at 227.
184
Id. at 231.
185
Id. at 233.
186
Id. at 234.
187
See supra note 82.
180
181
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violate the data privacy of U.S. citizens since the disclosure is
governed by the UK laws, only.188
2. Judicial Standard of Reasonable Justification
In the United States, the Fourth Amendment is the primary
safeguard against the government’s investigatory power. 189 In the
context of electronic evidence, the U.S. government needs to obtain
a judicial warrant in order to collect relevant data from the CSPs.
The government has the burden of proving “probable cause” in front
of the FISC to obtain approval.190
For the United Kingdom, the most equivalent legal safeguard
against intrusion of privacy is Article 8 of the European Convention
on Human Rights, which states that privacy is a fundamental human
right.191 Article 8 is also the basis on which the CJEU ruled against
parts of the UK’s surveillance regime in Big Brother Watch and
Others v. United Kingdom.192 While the Court in Big Brother Watch
did not assess the IPA directly, it found that bulk interception of
communications and obtainment of data from the CSPs by the UK
government violated the Article.193 One of the reasons cited was the
insufficient oversight of such collection by the UK Investigatory
Powers Tribunal.194
The CLOUD Act and the Executive Agreement only require that
the UK courts find “reasonable justification” that the disclosure of
data from the CSPs is warranted. 195 Because both documents
recognize that only the UK laws will govern the procedure in the
188

See U.S.-UK/Ir. Executive Agreement, supra note 28, art. 3(2).
See Gonzalez, supra note 10, at 23.
190
See supra note 148.
191
European Court of Human Rights on Guide on Article 8 of the European
Convention
on
Human
Rights
(Aug.
31,
2019),
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_8_ENG.pdf.
192
Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom, 299 Eur. Ct. H.R.
__ (2018), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press#{%22itemid%22:[%220036187848-8026299%22]}.
193
Id. at 3-4.
194
Sean Gallagher, “Bulk Interception” by GCHQ (and NSA) Violated
Human Rights Charter, European Court Rules, ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 13, 2018),
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2018/09/bulk-interception-by-gchq-and-nsaviolated-human-rights-charter-european-court-rules/.
195
U.S.-UK/Ir. Executive Agreement, supra note 28, art. 5(1), (2).
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United Kingdom, probable cause standard required by the Fourth
Amendment will play no role in the issuance of judicial order by the
UK authorities. As mentioned above, the IPC needs to consider
whether the warrant signed by the Secretary of State is related to
acceptable and legitimate objectives and the collection of data is
proportionate to achieving that goal. 196 In doing so, the IPC will
most likely adopt the reasonable justification standard set by UK
courts,197 which has a lower burden of proof than the probable cause
standard.198 This lack of protection under the Fourth Amendment
will increase the possibility of incidental collection of U.S. citizens’
data in the process of collecting that of targeted UK citizens by the
UK government.
III. ADOPTING EU STANDARDS AND INCREASING CSPS’ ROLES
While it is clear that incidental collection of data is a problem
that the lawmakers were aware of, neither the CLOUD Act nor the
Executive Agreement indicates any specific solution to prevent the
collection of such data in the first place. On the other hand,
recognizing privacy as one of the fundamental rights, the EU has
been at the forefront of developing strong data protection laws
globally.199 This Part looks at the legal regime implemented by the
EU to ensure the protection of consumer data, and how a similar
approach could fill in the gap.
To this end, Section III.A highlights transferrable aspects of
approaches taken by the European bloc. It should be noted that while
adopting some of the approaches taken by the bloc would make the
data transfer between the United States and the United Kingdom
safer in theory, this will be easier said than done due to differences
in laws and policies of the EU and the United States. For instance,
the EU recognizes its citizens’ Right to be Forgotten while it lacks
See IPA, supra note 23, c. 25, §§ 23, 140, 159.
Id., c. 25, § 23(2)(a) (“In deciding whether to approve a [warrant under the
IPA,] the Judicial Commissioner must—(a) apply the same principles as would
be applied by a court on an application for judicial review. . .”).
198
See Gonzalez, supra note 10 (arguing that the tests used by the
Investigatory Powers Commission in its proportionality assessment of warrant for
decryption under the Investigatory Powers Act is a low bar).
199
See ANU BRADFORD, THE BRUSSELS EFFECT: HOW THE EUROPEAN UNION
RULES THE WORLD 131-170 (2020).
196
197
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the Fourth Amendment rights protected by the U.S. Constitution.
Another difference between the two is each entity’s treatment of
data privacy: in the United States, it is treated as a transferrable
commodity whereas the EU considers data privacy to be a
fundamental human right.200
Thus, Section III.B discusses alternative, and perhaps
complementary, methods to achieve the same goal: the increased
role of the private sector, namely the CSPs. That Section will focus
on how they may also contribute to the protection of data privacy of
U.S. Citizens when data transfers are executed under the CLOUD
Act and the Executive Agreement. This may require some
modification of the two, which also will not come easily. However,
as seen from the CSPs support of the CLOUD Act in the first place,
it seems that they would be willing to take more of an active role,
making it a possible solution.201
A. Legislative Amendments in Reference to the GDPR
Few would question the relatively dominating role of the EU in
shaping the data privacy laws around the globe. It is said that this
effect is likely to continue for some time despite the steady decreases
in the EU’s market share in the digital economy with the rise of other
countries such as China and India.202 Section III.A.1 looks at how
the CLOUD Act may be amended to include increased oversight in
the process of evaluating candidate countries and determining
whether they qualify for executive agreements. In doing so, that
Section discusses the procedures taken by the EU in evaluating
candidacy for Adequacy Decisions under the GDPR. 203 Also
See id.
See Support for the CLOUD Act of 2018, MICROSOFT (Apr. 11, 2018)
https://blogs.microsoft.com/wp-content/uploads/prod/sites/5/2018/04/Supportfor-the-CLOUD-Act-of-2018_4.11.18.pdf.
202
See BRADFORD, supra note 199.
203
To be sure, the CLOUD Act deals with cross-border data transfers for the
purpose of criminal investigation, while the Adequacy Decisions—which deals
with personal data transfer for commercial purposes—do not. However, because
this Section looks at the procedures taken before the Adequacy Decision is
granted to another country, this difference has no significance. Emphasis is given
to the symmetry of the purposes behind Adequacy Decisions and the CLOUD Act
to ease transfer of private data without additional procedure and authorization.
200
201
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looking at the corresponding Articles in the GDPR, Section III.A.2
proposes legislative amendments to the CLOUD Act which may
provide rights to remedy and to file a complaint under the statute to
private persons.
1. Amending the Process of Evaluating QFGs
Article 45 of the GDPR addresses the Adequacy Decisions, a
method allowed under the Regulation through which private entities
can transfer personal information of data subjects to other countries
or international organizations.204 Foreign countries seek Adequacy
Decisions from the EU which, if granted, allow businesses operating
in both countries to transfer commercial data beyond their borders
with ease. Before granting an affirmative decision, the bloc goes
through a rigorous process of evaluating the adequacy of privacy
protection laws in candidate countries. 205
For example, the European Commission issued an Adequacy
Decision with Japan in January 2019. 206 The final adoption came
only after the Japanese government’s adoption of Supplementary
Rules which enhanced the country’s existing privacy laws to
provide as robust data protection as the GDPR. 207 As of this writing,
the EU has a similar ongoing negotiation with the Republic of Korea
(Korea). Korea sought Adequacy Decisions with the EU in 2015,
but the European Commission flagged the inadequate independence
of the relevant enforcement bodies.208 More specifically, under the
See GDPR, art. 45.
EUR. COMM’N., Digital Single Market – Communications on Exchanging
and Protecting Personal Data in a Globalised World Questions and Answers (Jan.
10, 2017) (“An adequacy decision is a decision taken by the Commission
establishing that a third country provides a comparable level of protection of
personal data to that in the European Union, through its domestic law or its
international commitments. As a result, personal data can flow from the [EU] to
that third country, without being subject to any further safeguards or
authorisations.”).
206
Věra Jourová, EUR. COMM’N., EU Japan Adequacy Decision (Jan. 2019).
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/research_and_innovation/law_and_regul
ations/documents/adequacy-japan-factsheet_en_2019_1.pdf.
207
See id.; see also EUR. COMM’N., International Data Flows: Commission
Launches the Adoption of its Adequacy Decision on Japan (Sept. 5, 2019),
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_5433.
208
David Meyer, South Korea’s EU Adequacy Decision Rests on New
204
205
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Korean data protection law, the Personal Information Protection
Act, the enforcement power lied with the Ministry of Interior and
Safety. 209 The most recent amendment passed in the peninsular
country on January 9, 2020, was specifically aimed at successfully
obtaining an Adequacy Decision from the EU by creating an
independent agency.210
The EU has adopted adequacy decisions for the following
countries and territories: Andorra, Argentina, Canada, Faeroe
Islands, Guernsey, Israel, Isle of Man, Jersey, New Zealand,
Switzerland, Uruguay, and Japan. 211 Currently, there is a partial
Adequacy Decision granted by the EU for the United States,
meaning only some data may be transferred between the two
countries under limited circumstances. 212 In assessing the adequacy
of the data protection laws of a country, the European Commission
looks at similar elements that the U.S. Attorney General is to
consider under the CLOUD Act in evaluating foreign governments
as candidates for an executive agreement. Some similar elements
are, among others, laws protecting human rights and privacy, and
clear procedures to achieve this objective.213
However, one clear distinction is that the process of evaluating
a foreign country’s privacy laws and ultimately adopting Adequacy
Legislative Proposal, IAPP (Nov. 27, 2018), https://iapp.org/news/a/southkoreas-eu-adequacy-decision-rests-on-new-legislative-proposals/.
209
Articles 52 and 53 of the GDPR requires an independent supervisory
authority within the country that seeks Adequacy Decision from the EU. Id.
210
Personal Information Protection Commission, 2019 Annual Report:
Personal Information Protection in Korea, 131-32 (Aug. 30, 2019),
http://www.pipc.go.kr/ebook/y201908/index.html (S. Korea).
211
Adequacy Decisions: How the EU Determines if a Non-EU Country has
an
Adequate
Level
of
Data
Protection,
EUR.
COMM’N.,
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/international-dimensiondata-protection/adequacy-decisions_en.
212
This limitation is due to the EU’s stance that there are some parts of the
data privacy law in the United States that are inadequate. See EUR. COMM’N.,
supra note 205(“The EU-U.S. Privacy Shield framework is a ‘partial’ adequacy
decision, as , in the absence of general data protection law in the U.S., only the
companies committing to abiding by the binding Privacy Shield principles benefit
from easier data transfers.”).
213
For non-exhaustive elements that must be considered by the European
Commission in assessing the adequacy of the level of data protection of a
prospective country, see GDPR, art. 45(2)(a).
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Decisions involves relatively more inputs from other independent
authorities. The process involves (1) a proposal from the European
Commission with (2) reference to an opinion of the EDPB which
consists of one representative from each Member State pursuant to
Article 68 of the GDPR, (3) approval by representatives of the
Member States, and, finally, (4) the adoption decision by the
European Commission.214 By contrast, the CLOUD Act explicitly
states that the Attorney General’s final determination will not be
subject to any judicial or administrative review. 215 To be sure, under
the CLOUD Act, the Attorney General’s evaluation of a QFG and
the final executive agreement is subject to review by Congress.216
But the statute, which does not require affirmative approval of the
Legislative branch but rather only mandates that Congress object if
unsatisfied, fails to elaborate what would happen if Congress does
not review the executive agreements. 217 In that scenario, the
Executive Branch would be the de facto sole determiner of
qualifying governments.
The authority to evaluate a foreign government could also be
given to an independent authority in addition to the Attorney
General. At minimum, an independent agency or a committee
should have the authority to approve or disapprove the decision of
the Attorney General. This would decrease the possibility of the
United States entering into an executive agreement with a foreign
government whose data protection laws are inadequate to minimize
the incidental collection or abuse of data of U.S. citizens, and, thus,
breach of their privacy.
2. Cause of Action and Remedy for Private Persons
As it stands currently, the Executive Agreement does not give
rise to any right or remedy on the part of private persons. 218
214

See EUR. COMM’N., supra note 211.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2523(c) (“Limitation on Judicial Review—A
determination or certification made by the Attorney General under subjection (b)
shall not be subject to judicial or administrative review.”).
216
See 18 U.S.C. § 2523(d)(4).
217
See id.
218
See U.S.-UK/Ir. Executive Agreement, supra note 28, art. 3(4) (“The
provisions of this Agreement shall not give rise to a right or remedy on the part of
any private person, including to obtain, suppress or exclude any evidence, or to
215
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Incorporation of provisions similar to Chapter VIII of the GDPR
would invoke additional efforts by the CSPs and the QFG to ensure
that collection of U.S. citizens’ data does not occur. Simply put,
Chapter VIII of the GDPR grants data subjects the right to file a
complaint under the Regulation to seek judicial remedies against the
government entities and the CSPs in cases of data breach. 219 If the
data subjects suffered damages, the CSPs will also have to
compensate the victims,220 and any other infringement may subject
the CSPs to administrative fines 221 as well as penalties under the
laws of the Member States.222
The CLOUD Act and the Executive Agreement should be
modified to carve out instances that give cause of action to U.S.
citizens when their data has been incidentally collected. Of course,
to be compatible with the Executive Agreement, the right should not
be exercised to obstruct criminal investigations. Further amendment
should provide for remedies ex post so that the requesting QFG and
the CSPs would be more cautious in identifying the data that belongs
to U.S. citizens.
Similarly, the Executive Agreement and the CLOUD Act could
be further amended to impose obligations on the CSPs to take
sufficient efforts to ensure that U.S. citizens’ data is not sent to the
QFGs, and, if any material data belong to U.S. citizens are
identified, to take adequate steps to quash or modify the motion
pursuant to the Agreement. Enforcing fines and penalties to
inadequate measures taken by CSPs when they reasonably knew or
should have known the inclusion of U.S. citizens data in their
transfers may also provide additional safeguards.
B. Increasing the Role of the CSPs
Another solution is to have the CSPs take more active roles in
data collection under the CLOUD Act and executive agreements.
Neither the CLOUD Act nor the Executive Agreement requires the

impede the execution of Legal Process.”).
219
See GDPR, art. 77, 78, 79.
220
Id. art. 82.
221
Id. art. 83.
222
Id. art. 84.
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CSPs to comply with requests of data by the UK authorities.223 At
the same time, they do not require the CSPs to take any additional
measures to safeguard the data of U.S. citizens. Adopting some of
the specific requirements the CSPs must abide by under the GDPR
into the executive agreements or the CLOUD Act may provide
additional protection of U.S. citizens’ privacy. Section III.B.1
proposes requiring the CSPs to provide notifications to the
consumers in instances of privacy breach via incidental collection.
Section III.B.2 proposes implementing procedures under which the
CSPs could file Motions to Quash and/or Modify judicial orders
granted by foreign courts with less stringent standard if potentiality
of incidental collection is identified.
1. Notification Obligation
Article 7 of the GDPR requires the CSPs to obtain explicit
consent from the users in terms of how their data is processed. 224 At
least with respect to U.S. citizens who are identified to be using
services from the U.S.-based CSPs, the providers should be required
to explicitly disclose that their data is not to be collected by the
foreign authorities. While doing so, the CSPs could ask for consent
were this to be the case for the purposes identified in the underlying
executive agreements. This would be the simplest and the easiest
way to solve the problem of incidental collection, for the collection
would have been agreed upon by the U.S. citizens ex ante. However,
it is unlikely that many U.S. persons would agree to have their
private information exposed. Taking this step, nonetheless, would at
least inform the users of the possibility of incidental collection of
their data and increase awareness of the problem.
Currently, the CLOUD Act does not create any obligation on the
CSPs to take such action, but they are subject to the domestic law of
the QFG.225 This means, for example, the CSPs have no obligation
to notify the U.S. citizens’ whose data has been collected by the UK
government unless the UK law requires such notification. An
See 18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(4)(D)(iii); see also U.S.-UK/Ir. Executive
Agreement, supra note 28, art. 6(3).
224
See GDPR, art. 7.
225
The Purpose and Impact of the CLOUD Act – FAQs, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/dag/page/file/1153466/download.
223
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obligation can be imposed upon the CSPs to notify the U.S. citizens
when their data has been transferred to a QFG. If enforced, such
requirements would parallel Article 19 and Article 34 of the GDPR.
Article 19 requires the CSPs, upon request by the data subjects, to
inform the consumers of the recipients of their data.226 By contrast,
under Article 34, the CSPs have affirmative obligation to notify to
the data subjects if their data has been breached.227 Combining these
rules, the CSPs can be required to provide detailed notification when
consumer data has been transferred to a QFG under the executive
agreement. While this obligation by itself may not prevent all
incidental collections, in conjunction with other remedies mentioned
above, it will increase the role of the CSPs in making sure the data
requested by, and transferred to, QFGs do not include personal
information of U.S. citizens.
2. Objection to Search Warrants
The CLOUD Act allows the CSPs to file a motion to quash or
modify a search warrant if they reasonably believe that disclosure of
requested data would violate the laws of a QFG.228 However, the
language of the statute suggests that this only applies to CSPs move
to modify or quash judicial orders in the United States. 229 The only
other provision that seems to apply to Motions to Modify or Quash
judicial orders in a foreign court is 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), which
allows the court to grant such motion “if the information or records
requested are unusually voluminous” or “compliance with such
See GDPR, art. 19.
Id. art. 34.
228
See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(h)(2)(A)(ii); see also supra notes 77-80 and
accompanying texts.
229
The relevant provisions do not specify whether they are referring to courts
in the United States or in the QFGs. See generally id. § 2703(h)(2). But the CSPs
must show that the consumer is not a U.S. person, and, thus, the request is
inappropriate—which would be the case only if the judicial order was obtained
by the United States to obtain data of a non-U.S. person. Moreover, the provisions
on comity analysis directs the court with such motion to take into consideration
“the interest of the United States,” id. § 2703(h)(3)(A), and “the interests of the
[QFG] in preventing any prohibited disclosure.” Id. § 2703(h)(3)(B). Therefore,
the only provision in the CLOUD Act that speaks to Motions to Modify or Quash
search warrant seems to apply in U.S. courts only.
226
227
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order otherwise would cause an undue burden on [the CSPs].”230
The Executive Agreement merely states that the CSPs may make
objections to the UK government “when it has reasonable belief that
the Agreement may not be properly invoked with regards to the
[search warrant]” upon issuance of the order for disclosure. 231 No
other relevant detail is present in the document.
In theory, a U.S.-based CSP should be able to object to the
search warrants issued by the UK authorities given that it believes
that the order does not meet the requirements set by the CLOUD Act
and the Executive Agreement. However, the likelihood of success is
questionable, especially given the lack of specificity as to how
foreign courts should deal with such objections. As discussed,
persons in the United Kingdom do not enjoy the equivalent
protection of the Fourth Amendment. Rather, satisfaction of a
reasonable justification standard by the UK authorities is sufficient
to issue an order. And because only the UK laws apply according to
the Executive Agreement,232 the CSPs will not be able to object to
the issued order even if they believe that there is no probable cause
for the order. To be clear, this would not be a problem if only the
data of UK citizens are requested. But when there are possibilities
that data belonging to U.S. citizens may also be collected, and even
if the CSPs are aware of such possibilities, there is no ground for
objection under the current statute and the Executive Agreement
since both documents only refer to intentionally targeted persons
who are, presumably, the UK citizens.233
It is less realistic to force the probable cause standard onto all
the warrants issued by the UK authorities. But it may be possible to
enforce such standard when data belonging to U.S. persons is
involved. One solution is to allow for review by the U.S. authorities
early on in the process if the CSPs can show that the disclosure of
data of the targeted UK person would also include that of U.S.
persons. A creation of a separate procedure may allow an
independent authority within the U.S. government to review the
order, for example. But there is an uneasy possibility that this
additional step might defeat the original purpose of the CLOUD Act
230

Id. § 2703(d).
U.S.-UK/Ir. Executive Agreement, supra note 28, art. 5(11).
232
See id. art. 3(2).
233
See id. art. 4(3); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2523 (b)(4)(A).
231

290

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 15:3

which is to reduce the time lag behind the transfer of data for
criminal investigation. Still, at a minimum, the CSPs should be
allowed to communicate to the UK and the U.S. governments
regarding the extent to which U.S. persons’ data is integrated with
that of the targeted person.
Additionally, the language in the CLOUD Act may be amended
to permit the CSPs to object to judicial orders of QFGs by adopting
similar provisions regarding the requirements of Motion to Modify
or Quash in the United States. This way, in the United Kingdom, for
example, a CSP could object to UK court orders if it reasonably
believes that the targeted person is not a UK citizen, does not reside
in the United Kingdom, and if the disclosure would violate US laws.
Thus, the Fourth Amendment will come into play. The UK
authorities would be forced to use caution when requesting certain
data from the CSPs in order to avoid invoking any objections, which
comes with the risk of delaying the investigation process. This will
permit the CSPs with more avenues to take an active role in
protecting the consumer data from unlawful disclosure by
effectively enforcing the probable cause standard.
CONCLUSION
The CLOUD Act, as part of a larger omnibus bill, was passed
within three-weeks after the Supreme Court heard the arguments
from the parties in Microsoft. In doing so, Congress implied that
protecting privacy comes second to expediting criminal
investigations processes. This is further supported by the fact that
the United Kingdom is the first country to have entered into an
executive agreement, given the strength of UK laws’ protection for
privacy, or rather, lack thereof.
To protect the privacy of the U.S. citizens while also fulfilling
the primary purpose behind the CLOUD Act, clarifying clear
standards to be applied in evaluating a foreign government’s
candidacy is essential. Alternatively, an independent authority may
be created to provide input in determining whether a prospective
foreign government satisfies the elements laid out in the CLOUD
Act. Furthermore, legislative actions can create additional avenues
for relief to U.S. citizens whose privacy has been breached. Lastly,
the CSPs can also play an active role in protecting consumer data by
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requiring them to implement similar notification procedures and
providing specific grounds for them to object to a QFG’s request for
data.
Looking forward, without additional safeguards discussed here,
the European country’s arguably less robust privacy laws may
become the new standard to be met by other potential QFGs. In other
words, another foreign country with a minimal data protection
regime may qualify for an executive agreement as long as its privacy
laws is as strong as those of the United Kingdom. This does not seem
to be a high bar, taking into consideration the EU’s refusal to declare
that the country is eligible for an Adequacy Decision “by default”
upon its exit from the bloc. 234 This implies that even the EU cannot
confidently say that the UK data protection laws as they stand
currently meets the higher standards set by the GDPR. If the UK
privacy laws become the norm, the United States may be further
behind its competitors as other countries introduce increasingly
robust privacy laws to attract businesses and gain market share in
the digital economy.
To be sure, the primary purpose of the CLOUD Act, which is to
smooth the cross-border data transfer for criminal investigation
purposes, is noble and crucial, especially today when the rate at
which the digital economy is growing overwhelmingly outpaces that
of its regulations. As of this writing, the Congressional review
period required under the CLOUD Act of the Executive Agreement

234
UK sent “chilling” warning over EU Adequacy Decision, GDPR
ASSOCIATES (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.gdpr.associates/uk-sent-chillingwarning-eu-adequacy-decision/; see also Cameron Abbott, Post-Brexit Data
Protection – Where Are We Now?, THE NAT’L. L. REV. (Feb. 4, 2020)
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/post-brexit-data-protection-where-arewe-now; David Cowan, GDPR Regime Emerges as Early Candidate for PostBrexit Divergence, THE GLOB. LEGAL POST (Feb. 4, 2020)
http://www.globallegalpost.com/big-stories/gdpr-regime-emerges-as-earlycandidate-for-post-brexit-divergence-460121/ (reporting that the United
Kingdom’s Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab said that the country will “not be
aligning with EU rules.”).
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has not lapsed yet. 235 While there is little doubt that Executive
Agreement will go unchallenged by the Legislature, this Article
identifies potential problems regarding data privacy that should be
considered regardless of whether the Executive Agreement is
approved or not. To be clear, the problems identified in this Article
are only the tip, if that, of myriad issues and uncertainties
surrounding cross-border data transfer. At the minimum, this Article
emphasizes that it is difficult to balance the importance of data
privacy and that of criminal prosecutions. But this balancing must
be taken with careful consideration and scrutiny when implementing
a new data protection regime today.

235

On January 16, 2020, Assistant Attorney General Stephen E. Boyd sent a
letter to Congress stating that, while the Executive Agreement was entered into in
October 2019, because the Department of Justice failed to notify the Congress
until January 10, 2020 due to “clerical error . . . [DOJ] considers July 8, 2020 to
be the date upon which the agreement will enter into force, absent the enactment
into law of a resolution of disapproval as set forth under [18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)].”
Supplementary Letter from Assistant Att’y Gen. Stephen E. Boyd to U.S.
Congress in Support of U.S.-U.K. CLOUD Act Agreement, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.
(Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/dag/page/file/1236281/download.

